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EDITORIAL NOTE
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS IN WEST VIRGINIA
A constructive trust, as has often been pointed out, is not a
true trust at all, but is purely a remedial device' used by equity to
prevent unjust enrichment. Hence, instead of dealing with constructive trusts as part of the law of trusts, the American Law Institute has included the subject in its Restatement of the Law of
Restitution. According to the Restatement,
"Where a person holding title to property is subject to
an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that
he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain
it, a constructive trust arises." 2
Or to put it another way, paraphrasing Judge Hatcher's language
in State v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company3 in order to
give effect to the maxim that "no man shall be permitted to profit
'Pound,

The Progress of the Law---Eguity (1920) 33 HAmv. L. REV. 420,

420-421.

2RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION (1937)

§ 160.
3 114 W. Va. 109, 113, 170 S. E. 909 (1933).
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by his own wrong", equity requires one who wrongfully obtains
title to, or an interest in, property to hold it as constructive trustee
for the one beneficially entitled. Aside from the fact that in a
constructive trust, as in an express trust, one person holds property
subject to the equitable interest of another, there is little similarity
between the two. Unlike an express trust, a constructive trust is
not a fiduciary relation and in no way depends upon the intention
of the parties.4
Care should also be taken to distinguish a constructive trust
from a resulting trust. Since both arise by implication or operation
of law, there is a tendency to confuse them. It should be remembered, however, that a resulting trust is based upon presumed intention to create a trust, and if such intention is inferred, the
trustee, "like the trustee of an express trust, is in a fiduciary relation to the beneficiary of the trust.' ' On the other hand, as has already been pointed out, a constructive trust is not a fiduciary relation, and has nothing to do with the intention of the parties, but
is imposed without regard and often contrary to their intention in
order to prevent unjust enrichment. Although our court has not
always kept the difference between a resulting and a constructive
trust in mind,6 that it does recognize the difference is clear. Commenting on two possible theories of the plaintiff's bill in Patrick
v. Stark, the court said:
"... In the former case, he would set up a resultant trust,
an equitable title in the land, which a court of equity would
sustain, on the presumption that it was the intention of the
parties, to make the one holding the legal title a trustee for
the other. In the latter case, the bill would allege what is
known in equity as a constructive trust, resting upon a fraud
which made
the perpetrator thereof a trustee for the injured
7
party. '
In view of the fact that a constructive trust is simply a
remedial device employed by equity to prevent the unjust enrichment of a wrongdoer who has acquired property under circum4RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 160, Comment a, which see for further
discussion of the difference between the two. See also Keller v. Washington,
83 W. Va. 659, 665-666, 98 S. E. 880 (1919). Note that in this case our court
seems to have used the terms constructive trust and resulting trust as synonymous. That these two should also be kept separate, see discussion, infra.
5 RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 160, Comment b.
6 See n. 4, supra.
7 62 W. Va. 602, 605-606, 59 S.E. 606 (1907). And of. Johnson's Exr's v.
Johnson, 83 W. Va. 593, 98 S.B. 812 (1919).
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stances rendering it inequitable for him to retain the property, it
is obviously impossible to catalog all the situations in which a constructive trust will be raised. The specific instances, according to
Pomeroy, are "as numberless as the modes by which property may
be obtained, through bad faith and unconscientious acts." 8 This
being true, no effort will be made in this note to cover even all of
the situations in which our court has granted relief by way of constructive trusts. Attention will be called to some of the more
typical examples, however, to show the extent to which the principle has been developed in our cases, and also to show some of the
instances in which our law, because of statutory provisions, differs
from the general law of other states.
The fact that a constructive trust is only a remedial device of
equity, carries with it a limitation on its use. If the injured party
has an adequate remedy at law, equity may refuse relief by way
of constructive trust, because such relief is not necessary to prevent
unjust enrichment. This is well illustrated by a West Virginia
case9 in which the plaintiff sought to charge the defendant as trustee
of the proceeds of timber cut on plaintiff's land. In refusing because of the adequacy of the legal remedy to enforce a constructive
trust, the court very properly intimated that, had the plaintiff been
able to prove the defendant's alleged insolvency, the result would
have been otherwise, because then a judgment at law for the trespass would have been an inadequate remedy.'"
Another illustration of equity's refusal to enforce a constructive trust because of adequacy of the remedy at law is found in
the case where title to ordinary chattels is obtained. by fraud.
Probably the most typical constructive trust is that based on fraud.
According to the Restatement,
"Where the owner of property transfers it, being induced
by fraud, duress or undue influence of the transferee, the
transferee holds the property upon a constructive trust for the
transferor.""'

mRoy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 1045.
9W. M. Ritter Lumber Co. v. Lowe, 75 W. Va. 714, 84 S. B. 566, L.R.A.
1916E 718 (1915).
10 For other illustrations of a refusal to raise a constructive trust because
of the adequacy of the legal remedy, see RESTATMIENT, RESTITUTION § 160,
Comments e and f.
11 Id.at § 166.

s Po
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If the property involved is land, relief in equity by way of cancellation of the deed or reconveyance of title is clear. 2 However, if
the property transferred is money or an ordinary chattel so that a
judgment at law would be an adequate remedy, equity will refuse
relief by way of constructive trust. 3
The largest group of West Virginia cases involving construcfive trusts illustrates the general principle that
"Where a person in a fiduciary relation to another acquires property, and the acquisition or retention of the property is in violation of his duty as fiduciary,
he holds it upon a
4
constructive trust for the other."'
The case of Feamster v. Feamster" is an excellent application of
this principle. B was trustee for 0 of a judgment for more than
$5,000, which was a junior lien on land of the judgment debtor.
B purchased the land at the judicial sale for a sum only a few
dollars in excess of the total prior liens. Immediately thereafter
B sold about one-third of the land for nearly $1,000 more than he
had paid for the whole tract. It was held that B as constructive
trustee would have to account to C both for the profit realized and
for the land still retained. As clearly shown in the court's opinion,
the constructive trust raised in this type of case is, in the language
of Cardozo, "the remedial device through which preference of self
is made subordinate to loyalty to others."' '
This principle has
been applied by our court to disloyal fiduciaries of all dnds-public
officials,' 7 agents, 8 attorneys," executors, 0 partners and joint adventurers.21
12 See, for example, Burrows v. Fitch, 62 W. Va. 116, 57 S. E. 283 (1907).
That the same is true where the transfer is based on mistake, see RESTATEMENT,
RESTITUTION §§ 163-165.
For other cases where relief in equity was based on fraud, see Bennett v.
Hlarper, 36 W. Va. 546, 15 S. E. 143 (1892); Dickel v. Smith, 38 W. Va. 635,
18 S. E. 721 (1893) (so-called "constructive fraud"); Board of Trustees of
the Lewis Prichard Charity Fund v. Mankin Investment Co., 118 W. Va. 134,
189 S. E. 96 (1936); same case on second appeal, 193 S. E. 805 (W. Va. 1937).
1RESTTEMENT, RESTITUTION § 166, Comment b.
But note that if the
remedy at law is inadequate, as where the chattels are unique or the wrongdoer
is insolvent, relief may be had in equity.
14Id. at § 190. For specific applications and detailed discussion of this
general principle, see c. 12 of the RESTATEMENT.
15 35 W. Va. 1, 13 S. E. 53 (1891).
16 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 467, 164 N. E. 545 (1928).
17 County Court of Raleigh County v. Cottle, 81 W. Va. 469, 94 S. E.
948 (1918).
IsMorris v. Joseph, 1 W. Va. 256, 91 Am. Dec. 386 (1866); Franks v.
Morris, 9 W. Va. 664 (1876); Blake v. O'Neal, 63 W. Va. 483, 61 S. E. 410
(1908) ; Spriggs v. McCreery, 87 W. Va. 204, 104 S. E. 479 (1920).
19 Jackson v. Strader, 61 W. Va. 161, 56 S. E. 177 (1907).
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Because of the fact that so many of the cases involve breach
of a fiduciary relation, it should not be assumed that such a relation is necessary to the creation of a constructive trust. Equity
often bases a constructive trust on a wrong other than breach of
duty by a fiduciary. Thus, in Carleton Mining & Power Company
v. West Virginia Northern Railroad Company, 2 where the defendant had wrongfully obtained control of plaintiff's property and
had used it for his own benefit, it was held that the defendant as
constructive trustee must account to the plaintiff for the property
and for the profits derived from its use.
A classic example of the use of the constructive trust device
to prevent a wrongdoer from profiting by his wrong is found in
the cases dealing with acquisition of property by homicide. This
problem is of comparatively small importance in this state because
of our statute which provides that one convicted of feloniously killing another shall acquire from his victim no interest in any property by descent, by will, as beneficiary of an insurance policy, or
otherwise.2 3 Since our court in a recent case, however, has held that
although this statute makes conviction of a felonious killing conclusive against the slayer, it leaves the case of a non-felonious killing to be decided as it would have been in the absence of any
statute,2" it becomes important to determine what our law was prior
to the enactment of the statute.
Courts have generally dealt with the problem of a murderer's
right to recover as beneficiary of an insurance policy on the life
of his victim as distinct from the problem of a murderer's right to
inherit, take by devise, or otherwise acquire property from his
victim. Though differing in the theory by which the result 2is
' 5
reached, the decisions, including several from West Virginia,
Ash v. Wells, 76 W. Va. 711, 86 S. E. 750 (1915).
21 Battin v. Woods, 27 W. Va. 58 (1885); Berry v. Colborn, 65 W. Va.
493, 64 S. E. 636 (1909) ; Bond v. Taylor, 68 W. Va. 317, 69 S. E. 1000 (1911) ;
Floyd v. Duffy, 68 W. Va. 339, 69 S. E. 993, 33 L. R. A. (N. s.) 883 (1911);
Kersey v. Kersey, 76 W. Va. 70, 85 S. E. 22 (1915); Lopinsky v. Hurvitz, 87
W. Va. 422, 105 S. E. 593 (1921); Mullens v. Wolfe, 200 S. E. 37 (W. Va.
1938).
For a more detailed statement of
22 113 W. Va. 20, 166 S. E. 536 (1932).
the facts, see same case on a former appeal, 110 W. Va. 631, 631-633, 159
S. E. 44 (1931). See also Campbell v. O'Neill, 69 W. Va. 459, 471, 72 S. E.
732 (1911) (unauthorized dealings with plaintiff's property by one who assumed to act as guardian).
23 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 42, art. 4, § 2.
24 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 115 W. Va. 515, 177 S. E. 188 (1934).
25 Johnston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 85 W. Va. 70, 100 S. E. 865
(1919) ; Wichline v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 106 W. Va. 424, 145 S. E.
20
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are in substantial agreement "that a beneficiary cannot maintain
an action for insurance proceeds after having murdered the insured."'2 In other than the insurance cases, there are in the absence of statute three lines of authority, which are well summarized
in Bryant v. Bryant:
". .. (1) The legal title does not pass to the murderer as
heir or devisee; (2) the legal title passes to the murderer and
may be retained by him in spite of his crime; (3) the legal
title passes to the murderer, but equity will treat him as a
constructive trustee of the title because of the unconscionable
it to the
mode of its acquisition, and compel him to convey
21
heirs of the deceased, exclusive of the murderer."
Note that the insurance cases, holding that the slayer gets nothing,
are like the cases adopting the first of these theories. They have
nothing at all to do with the constructive trust theory which is
applicable only if the slayer acquires property of which he may be
required by equity to account as trustee.
The only West Virginia cases involving this broad problem
have been insurance cases holding that the slayer may not recover
and hence are not applications of the constructive trust theory.
Although this would seem to be clear, in one of these cases the court,
after quoting from Bryant v. Bryant, stated that in Johnston v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,8- it had adopted the constructive trust theory.29 An examination of the facts and holding
in the JohnstonL case makes this doubtful. In that case, the insured
was murdered by his wife who was the beneficiary of an insurance
policy on his life and also the sole distributee of his estate. It was
held that under these circumstances the insurance company was
not liable to anyone. The court said that on grounds of "public
policy" the wife could not recover. Further, although normally
recovery by the administrator of the insured would be allowed
743 (1928). Although the theory on which our court denies recovery in such
a case is not entirely clear, it would seem to be that murder of the insured
by the beneficiary is a risk impliedly excepted on grounds of public policy from
the risks assumed by the insurer. See State v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
114 W. Va. 109, 111-112, 170 S.E. 909 (1933).
26 Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory
Solution (1936) 49 HARv.L. Rnv. 715, 717, n. 8.
For further discussion of
27 193 N. C. 372, 374, 137 S.E. 188 (1927).
these three views, see BOGERT, TRuSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 478; Wade,
supra n. 21, at 717 et seq.; Comment (1936) 42 W. VA. L. Q. 241.
28 85 W. Va. 70, 100 S. E. 865 (1919). This was the first West Virginia
on the problem.
case
2
9 State v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 114 W. Va. 109, 113-114, 170
S. E. 909 (1933).
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for the benefit of the estate, such recovery was denied in this case
because the wife was the sole distributee. This being so, it seems
clear that the court did not hold that there was a constructive trust.
If so, who was the constructive trustee? What was the trust res?
Who was the beneficiary?
The only mention of a trust is found in the statement that
where the beneficiary is denied recovery, "a trust results in favor
of the estate of the insured." 3 An explanation more satisfactory
than the resulting trust theory would seem to be that given by the
court in the preceding sentence where it said that the proceeds of
the policy would become part of the estate of the insured in just
the same way that a lapsed bequest or devise would fall into the
residuary estate.
All of this seems to lead to but one conclusion-that our court
has not as yet applied the constructive trust doctrine to a case of
this sort. The most likely opportunity which may arise for such an
application in the future would come about through a combination
of the holding that our statute does not cover the case of a nonfelonious killing and the proposition stated in syllabus 4 of the
Johnston case that "the estate of one who is murdered will pass
by devolution to the person designated by law to take the same,
notwithstanding such person may have been guilty of murder in
taking the life of the one from whom he inherits.' " Thus, if a
wife should kill her husband under circumstances making her
guilty only of involuntary manslaughter and as a result should
take title to his property as heir, the question would then arise
whether she should be allowed to take beneficially under the second
view stated in Bryant v. Bryant or whether, in order to prevent her
from profiting by her crime, she should be required to hold the
property as constructive trustee for the person or persons who
would have taken had she predeceased her husband. It might be
noted that if the court should hold her accountable as constructive
trustee, it would reach a result contrary to that of the Restatement
which says that its rules "are not applicable where the slayer was
guilty only of manslaughter." 32 It should be stated, however, that
our court was correct in refusing recovery on an insurance policy
to the beneficiary who was guilty only of involuntary manslaughter,
because the test generally applied in the insurance cases is whether
so Johnston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 85 W. Va. 70, 73, 100 S. E.

865 (1919).

31 Id. at 70.

32 RESTATEmENT,

RESTITUTION

§ 187, Comment e.
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or not the death of the insured was intentionally caused by the
beneficiary." 8 3
Another possible and not unlikely way for the problem to
arise is found in the case where, though the killing was felonious,
there has been no conviction. Our statute covers only cases in
which there has been conviction of a felonious killing. If the killing was felonious, but there has been no conviction, our court would
probably hold that the case should be decided on general principles,
just as it did when there was conviction of a non-felonious killing.
Then under the rule stated in the Joknston case, the murderer
would get title to the property and the question would be whether
he took beneficially or as constructive trustee. According to the Restatement he would take as constructive trustee even though there
has been no conviction,34 and in view of our court's statement that
it has already adopted the constructive trust theory, there seems
little doubt that it would reach the same result.
One other situation, which raises interesting questions and has
caused considerable confusion in the field of constructive trusts but
which is also of comparatively small importance in this state, is the
acquisition of an interest in land under an oral agreement to hold
in trust, which agreement is unenforceable because of the Statute
of Frauds. 35 By statute adopted in 1931 oral trusts in land,
whether for the grantor or for a third party, are enforceable as
valid express trusts.36 Since, however, our court has held that this
statute is not retroactive, 37 the problem whether the grantee who
repudiates the trust holds as constructive trustee may still be raised
in connection with transfers made prior to the enactment of the
statute. Even before the statute a conveyance upon oral trust for
a third person was enforceable. 3 If the oral trust was for the
grantor, it was unenforceable and the grantee could not be held
as constructive trustee in the absence of fraud or breach of confidential relationship.3
CLYDE L. COLSON.
33 COOLEY, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1928) 5227.
34 RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTIO § 187, Comment f.
35 See id. §§ 182-183, for a discussion of the problem in general.

36 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 36, art. 1, § 4, applied in Winfree v. Dearth,
118 W. Va. 71, 188 S. E. 880 (1936).
37 Hall v. Burns, 113 W. Va. 820, 169 S. E. 522 (1933).
38 Madden, Trust and the Statute of Frauds (1925) 31 W. VA. L. Q. 166.
-9 Hall v. Burns, 113 W. Va. 820, 169 S. E. 522 (1933). This is substantially the rule adopted by the RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 182. See also
Note (1931) 37 W. VA. L. Q. 434.
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